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BANKRUPTCY

LAW-THIRD CIRCUIT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE

WITH THIRTY DAY RULE IN SECTION 362(e) OF BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND BANKRUPTCY RULE 4001(b)

Wedgewood Investment Fund, Ltd. v. Wedgewood Realty Group, Ltd. (1989)
When a debtor files for protection from creditors under the Bankruptcy Code,' all collection or enforcement actions by creditors are automatically stayed by section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 A secured
creditor on whose loan the debtor has defaulted will not be able to foreclose on his interest in the debtor's property without first obtaining relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay. 3 The court will grant the
creditor relief from the stay, unless the debtor is providing adequate
protection for the secured party's claim, or the property securing the
loan is necessary for the debtor's reorganization. 4 When Congress reformed the bankruptcy laws, it found that court delays in hearing mo1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & West
Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
2. Id. § 362(a). Section 362(a) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
[under the Bankruptcy Code] operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title,
or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; ....
Id. There are exceptions to the stay provisions for actions involving criminal
enforcement and some administrative proceedings. Id. § 362(b). The injunctive
provisions of section 362(a) have the purpose of protecting the debtor's assets
from "piecemeal liquidation" and are broad in scope, providing for a continuance of business or an orderly liquidation. L.
RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY

KING

& M. CooK, CREDITORS'

1031-32 (1985).

3. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)-(5) (1988) (acts to create, perfect or enforce security interests are prohibited after commencement of bankruptcy case). A secured
creditor may request relief from the stay pursuant to section 362(d), which, if

granted, will allow the secured creditor to proceed with its state law foreclosure
action. Id. § 362(d); see also L. KING & M. COOK, supra note 2, at 1033.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). The court may grant the secured creditor
relief if one of the two following conditions of section 362(d) is met:

(677)
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tions to lift the automatic stay were having adverse consequences on
debtors and secured creditors. 5 Congress therefore mandated strict

time constraints within which the court must act; failure to act would

result in automatic termination of the stay. 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Wedgewood Investment Fund, Ltd. v. Wedgewood Realty Group, Ltd. ,7 held that these time constraints must be strictly

observed and that a waiver of these constraints by a secured party will
only be found where there is clear creditor action. 8 The court also
found that a bankruptcy court could reimpose a stay which had lapsed by
using its general injunctive powers. 9 The Third Circuit found that a
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection
(a) of this section, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
Id.

Adequate protection under section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code is designed
to compensate parties with interests in property for decreases in the value of
their interest during the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 361; Miller & Bienstock, Adequate Protection in Respect of the Use, Sale or Lease of Property, 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 47
(1984). Where the debtor is not providing adequate protection, a creditor may
obtain relief from the stay as to that property not being protected. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1). Property is not being adequately protected when the debtor fails to
effectively compensate the creditor for loss in value of its collateral. Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus.,
Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1984). This will include a secured creditor's right to repossess, and prevents the debtor and other creditors from reaping a windfall from the secured creditor's money or collateral. See id. at 435. But
see United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484

U.S. 365, 382 (1988) (right to immediate foreclosure not protected under adequate protection).
Section 362(d)(2) may provide an alternative basis for relief from the stay.
This section first requires a showing that the debtor has no equity in the property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A). If the debtor has no equity in the property, the
debtor must show that the property is necessary for an effective reorganization
to prevent relief from being granted. Id. § 362(d)(2)(B). This requires "not
merely a showing that if there is conceivably to be an effective reorganization,
this property will be needed for it; but that the property is essential for an effective reorganization that is in prospect." Timbers, 484 U.S. at 375-76.
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 175 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6136 ("Too often today, court delay in handling requests
for relief amounts to a complete denial of relief.").
6. These time constraints are found in both the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rules. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1988) (governing time constraints for
initial hearing and preliminary hearing); FED. BANKR. R. 4001(b) (if order on
relief from stay motion not entered within 30 days of final hearing, stay will
terminate automatically).
7. 878 F.2d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1989) ("court failed to observe the stringent
time constraints . . . resulting in termination of the automatic stay").
8. Id. at 698 (waiver only found where "creditor takes some action which is
inherently inconsistent with adherence to the time constraints").
9. Id. at 700-02. The bankruptcy court draws its general injunctive powers
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strict enforcement of the time constraints was the intent of Congress
and should be enforced as such.' 0
Wedgewood Investment Fund, Ltd. (Wedgewood) held two
purchase money notes of Wedgewood Realty Group, Ltd. (Realty) secured by purchase money mortgages on Realty's property."l Upon default by Realty on the notes, Wedgewood commenced a foreclosure
action in state court to recover the real estate. 12 Prior to a hearing on
the foreclosure action, Realty filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code which automatically stayed the state court
3
proceedings. '
Soon after the bankruptcy filing, Wedgewood moved for relief from
the stay in order to proceed with its foreclosure action. 14 It filed its
motion onJuly 20, 1988, and the first hearing held on the motion was on
September 27, 1988.15 At the close of the hearing both Wedgewood
and Realty indicated they had completed their respective arguments. 16
On October 3, 1988, however, Wedgewood delivered a letter to the
bankruptcy judge which argued a new case relevant to Wedgewood's
motion for relief. 1 7 The bankruptcy court then granted Realty until Ocfrom section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which states: "The court may issue
any order ....
that is appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." I I
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). An order issued under this section may also be issued
sua sponte. Id. For a discussion of the powers conferred by section 105(a) and its
general injunctive powers, see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
10. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 696-98.
11. Id. at 695. The notes were for an amount in excess of $1,365,000 and
were secured by Realty's property in Florida. Id. This property constituted all
of Realty's assets. Id.
12. Id. The foreclosure action was commenced onJune 3, 1988 and a hearing was scheduled for July 1, 1988. Id.
13. Id. On June 30, 1988, Realty filed for protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
New Jersey. Id. Under section 362(a), the foreclosure action was automatically
stayed as of that date. Id. Chapter 11 allows a debtor to continue to operate its
business with protection from creditors if there is a hope of successful reorganization. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983).
14. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 695. Wedgewood moved pursuant to section
362(d) for relief from the stay, but the court's opinion is not concerned with the
substantive merits of the claim for relief. Id. The bankruptcy court eventually
denied Wedgewood's motion for relief and continued the effect of the stay as to
Wedgewood. Id. at 696.
15. Id. at 695. Although the hearing was originally scheduled for August
15, 1988, it had been continued at the request of both parties and the court. Id.
16. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court asked both parties if they
wanted to submit proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law, and both declined. Id. Counsel for Wedgewood indicated that she was "ready to shoot the
dice" and was prepared to "sign off." Id. These statements turned out to be
important to the court's analysis on the nature of the September 27 hearing,
whether it was preliminary or final. Id. at 698.
17. Id. at 695. The day after the September 27 hearing, Wedgewood delivered copies of the exhibits presented at trial, and also submitted a letter directing the judge's attention to certain portions of the transcript. Id. On
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tober 26, 1988 to respond to Wedgewood's letter.' 8
On November 14, 1988, Wedgewood notified the court that it considered the automatic stay as having terminated pursuant to Federal
Bankruptcy Rule 4001 (b) because the court failed to enter an order on
the motion for relief within thirty days of the September 27 hearing.19
The bankruptcy court rejected this assertion because it felt that Wedgewood's supplemental letter effectively carried the hearing date to October 26, a date within the thirty day time limit. 20 On November 23, 1988,
the bankruptcy court entered an order continuing the stay against
Wedgewood, which was subsequently upheld by the district court on
2
appeal. '
In Wedgewood, the Third Circuit first had to decide whether the stay
terminated automatically as a result of the bankruptcy court's alleged
failure to observe the time constraints. 22 Judge Rosenn, writing for the
majority, began by looking at the legislative history behind Congress'
imposition of time constraints on bankruptcy court rulings on relief
from stay motions. 23 The court acknowledged that the primary purpose
of the stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is to protect the debtor
and to provide a "breathing spell."12 4 The court further noted that the

Bankruptcy Code seeks to protect the interests of secured creditors by
allowing them to obtain relief from, or a modification of, the stay where
October 3, Wedgewood delivered a second letter to the judge which argued the
relevance of a new case to the motion for relief and provided more support for
its position. Id.
18. Id. Realty requested and received time to respond to Wedgewood's
supplemental letter, and the bankruptcy judge gave Realty until October 26,
1988. Id. Although Wedgewood did not contest the granting of additional time
to respond, it was not informed that Realty would have 20 days to respond, a
response date more than 30 days from the September 27 hearing. Id.
19. Id. at 696.
20. Id. The court said it had to wait until the final submissions by the parties
before it could make a final decision on the motion for relief from the stay. Id.
21. Id. The court denied the motion on the merits of Wedgewood's motion
for relief from the stay and continued the effect of the stay. Id.
22. Id. at 696.
23. Id.; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 344, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6300. The House Report states that the time constraints provide a protection not available under prior law to secured creditors. Id. The
Senate Report takes a similar posture on section 362(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,
5840. Both reports consider a failure to observe the time constraints as resulting in automatic termination of the stay. Id.; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at
344, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6300.
24. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 696; SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 54, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5840 ("The automatic stay is one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts ... and

all foreclosure actions.").
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the creditor has made the requisite showing. 2 5 When reforming the
bankruptcy laws, the court observed, Congress found that secured creditors and debtors were being prejudiced by court inaction and delays on
relief from stay actions. 2 6 The court also found that Congress streamlined the procedure on relief from stay actions, and, among other reforms, set up time limits within which the bankruptcy court would have
to act.2 7 The Wedgewood court concluded that Congress envisioned that
any failure by a bankruptcy court to observe these time limits would re28
sult in automatic termination of the stay.
The Wedgewood court then outlined the procedural aspects of relief
from stay motions. Within thirty days of the creditor filing the motion
for relief from the stay, the bankruptcy court must hold a hearing on
that motion.2 0 If that hearing is a preliminary one, the court must issue
a preliminary ruling at its conclusion and schedule a final hearing within
thirty days. 30 If the hearing held is a final hearing, the court has thirty
25. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 697 (section 362(d) permits secured creditor to
request that court grant it relief from stay). For the text of section 362(d) and a
discussion of what it requires a creditor to show to obtain relief from the stay,
see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
26. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 697 ("[U]nnecessary delays and adverse effects
on the bankrupt estate's assets and the rights of secured creditors . . . ha[ve]
historically been occasioned by inaction of the bankruptcy courts .... ").
27. Id. The time limits which were established can be found first in section
362(e):
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section
for relief from the stay ... such stay is terminated with respect to the
party in interest making such request, unless the court, after notice and
a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion
of, or as a result of, a final hearing .... A hearing under this subsection
may be a preliminary hearing .... If the hearing under this subsection
is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced
not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary
hearing.
11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1988). In conjunction with these time limits the Federal
Bankruptcy Rules provide further that the stay will terminate within 30 days of
the final hearing if an order continuing the stay is not entered within that time.
FED. BANKR. R. 4001(b). "The intent of the rule is to prevent a continuance of
4001.04
the stay solely due to court inaction." 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(15th ed. 1989).
The procedure was also streamlined into a one issue motion practice instead of the traditional adversary proceeding requiring a complaint and answer.
Id. at 4001.03. The only issue at a hearing on a motion for relief from stay will
be whether the stay should be continued in order to shorten the time involved.
Id.; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 344, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6300.
28. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 697. For a discussion of whether this result is
fair to the debtor, see infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
29. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 697.
30. Id. A preliminary hearing requires at least that the bankruptcy judge
hear evidence from both sides and make a finding on whether the debtor may
prevail. In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 71 Bankr. 925, 928 (W.D. Wash.
1987). A pre-hearing conference with a judge and both sides is not sufficient.
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days in which it may continue the stay pending a final decision or issue a
final decision on the continuance of the stay. 3 l The court stated that
"[t]hese time constraints are an essential underpinning to the automatic
stay provisions of the Code."'3 2 Thus, the court concluded, a failure to
observe any of the applicable time constraints will result in the stay terminating automatically as a matter of law."3

With the law and supporting policy established, the court addressed
the key legal determination of the lower courts: when the final hearing
took place.3 4 The Third Circuit, contrary to the bankruptcy court,
found the September 27 hearing to be the final hearing.3 5 The conduct
of both the court and the parties during and after the hearing was considered dispositive.3 6 Because an order on the stay was not issued
within thirty days of September 27, the court held that the stay terminated automatically. 3 7 Even assuming that the September 27 hearing
was only preliminary, as the bankruptcy court found, section 362(e) was
still violated, according to the Wedgewood court, because the bankruptcy
38
court failed to issue a preliminary ruling and schedule a final hearing.
Realty attempted to show that Wedgewood waived the time constraints by its submission of a letter to the bankruptcy judge with supplemental legal argument. 39 The Third Circuit entertained this argument
Id. The court must also make a preliminary finding on continuance of the stay
and schedule a final hearing for the hearing to be preliminary. Wedgewood, 878
F.2d at 697.
31. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 697-98.
32. Id. at 698.
33. Id. at 697.
34. Id. at 698. The Third Circuit concluded that the hearing of September
27, 1988 was final despite the fact that the bankruptcy court had characterized it
as preliminary. Id.
35. Id. (court considered preliminary and final hearings to have merged and
would consider September 27 hearing as final). Section 362(e) provides for this
result: "A hearing under this subsection may be the preliminary hearing, or may
be consolidated with a final hearing .... " 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1988).
36. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 698. Three factors influenced the court's decision on this matter: (1)both parties advised the court on September 27 that
they were ready for a final ruling; (2) the court failed to issue a preliminary order; and (3) the court did not schedule nor did either party request that the
court schedule a final hearing. Id.
37. Id. Thirty days from the September 27 hearing was October 26, and
because no order continuing the stay was made within that period, section
362(e) was violated. Id.
38. Id. According to the Third Circuit, the bankruptcy court failed to proceed properly on two grounds, assuming it was correct that the September 27
hearing was preliminary. Id. First, no preliminary ruling was issued at its conclusion as required by the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1988). In addition, the court failed to hold a final hearing within 30 days of the preliminary
hearing. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 698.
39. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 698-99. The debtor had argued that this was a
waiver, because it required a response which would postpone the time when the
judge could make a final ruling. Id. at 699.
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but found the law to require a clear waiver by Wedgewood which would
be "inherently inconsistent" with the imposed time constraints. 40 The
court looked at the nature of the submissions by Wedgewood and their
length, and noted that because a proper response could have been made
within the time constraints, no waiver was evident. 4 ' The inevitable result, according to the Wedgewood court, was that the stay terminated as to
42
Wedgewood.
The Wedgewood court still had to address the second issue raised by
Realty: whether the bankruptcy court had the power, through its general injunctive powers, to reimpose the stay after its lapse. 4 3 This was a
question of first impression in the Third Circuit, requiring the court to
reconcile conflicting bankruptcy court decisions within the circuit addressing the scope and applicability of the court's equitable powers
when faced with conflicting statements by Congress. 44 The court examined the two conflicting lines of authority and decided to follow the
one which would allow the court to reimpose the stay.4 5 The court recognized the concern of the opposing line of cases, drawn from the legislative history of the automatic stay provisions, which disapproved of a
circumvention of legislative will by a broad interpretation of the bank40. Id. The court looked at a series of decisions on waiver of the time constraints and found that clear creditor action was required. See, e.g., Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (11 th Cir. 1982) (implied waiver
where creditor attends final hearing outside 30 day limit without objection); In re
McNeely, 51 Bankr. 816, 821 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (creditor failed to schedule
hearing within 30 day period, resulting in waiver); In re Small, 38 Bankr. 143,
147 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984) (filing of discovery request necessitating reply outside
30 day period results in waiver by that creditor).
41. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 699. The bankruptcy court could have ordered
a response and provided a decision within the 30 day period. Id. The court's
actions were the sole cause of the delay. Id. In addition, Wedgewood could not
know of the extended response period so as to agree to its effect. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. These powers are contained in section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code which provides that the "court may issue any order ... necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). Realty argued that this section would allow the bankruptcy court to issue an order
reimposing the stay even after its lapse through inadvertence of the bankruptcy
court. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 699-700.
44. See Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 699-700. Compare In re Willbet Enter., Inc.,
43 Bankr. 90, 92-93 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (court cannot order appointment of
professional under section 105(a) where Congress has determined that none
should be appointed) with Spagnol Enter. v. Atlantic Fin. Fed. Sav. Assoc., 33
Bankr. 129, 131 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (court may continue stay where it has lapsed
inadvertently under section 362(e) by using section 105(a)) and In re Clark, 69
Bankr. 885, 892-93 (court found that even if there was lapse in stay, court has
power to reinstate through section 105(a)), aff'd in relevant part, 71 Bankr. 747
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
45. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701. The Wedgewood court stressed, however,
that reimposition of the automatic stay through section 105(a) would be appropriate only when requested by the debtor and not ordered by the court sua
sponte. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 6

684

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

35: p. 677

ruptcy court's injunctive powers.4 6 The Third Circuit considered the
legislative history behind the injunctive power provisions to be stronger
than that behind the automatic stay provisions regarding time constraints. 4 7 The court found that the bankruptcy court's injunctive powers could be used to reimpose a stay which lapsed because of the court's
own inaction. 4 8 The Wedgewood court reasoned that secured creditors
would not be harmed because the stay would be reimposed only if the
debtor meets standards more stringent than those governing what a
creditor would need for relief from the stay. 4 9 That fault would lie with
the bankruptcy court in such a case was important to the court's recon46. Id. at 700. The general principle behind this line of cases is that a bankruptcy court may not authorize something through its equitable powers which
"Congress had explicitly considered and limited." In re Dominelli, 788 F.2d
584, 586 (9th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy court not authorized to impose creditor's
legal expenses on debtor in chapter 7 through section 105(a)). The courts following this approach hold that Congress' imposition of time constraints mandate strict adherence and preclude the use of the court's equitable powers. In re
Marine Power & Equip. Co., 71 Bankr. 925, 929-30 (W.D. Wash. 1987). "In
extraordinary circumstances the equitable powers of this Court may be utilized
to prevent injury or correct errors, but nullification of the stay termination resulting from the operation of § 362(e) is not one of them." Id. at 930 (quoting
In re Wood, 33 Bankr. 320, 322-23 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983)). The Marine Power
court felt that "[t]o [reimpose the stay] is to judicially legislate and avoid clear
and expressly stated congressional intent." Marine Power, 71 Bankr. at 929
(quoting Wood, 33 Bankr. at 322). These courts considered the statutory language of section 362(e) to be the controlling law, and did not want a broad
interpretation of section 105(a) to circumvent it. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 700.
47. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701. "Congress clearly envisioned that section
105(a) would be available to issue an injunction on a case-by-case basis in situations expressly excepted from the automatic stay under section 362(a)." Id. As
evidence of this intent, the court relied on the fact that section 105(a) was available to the court to enjoin those proceedings which Congress had expressly removed from the scope of the automatic stay. Id. Because the court could find no
express intent on the part of Congress to preclude the use of section 105(a), it
determined that it could be used to reimpose the stay. Id.
48. Id. at 700-01. The court determined the procedure for reimposing the
stay is similar to seeking an injunction:
In order to obtain section 105(a) injunctive relief, the debtor, in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 7065 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 has the
burden of demonstrating to the court the following: substantial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm to the movant, harm to
the movant outweighs harm to the nonmovant, the injunctive relief
would not violate public interest.
Id. Reimposition of the stay will only be allowed "when the equities support
such action" and the above standards for relief are met. Id. at 701.
The Fifth Circuit supports this position. See In re Martin Exploration Co.,
731 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1984).
49. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 700. Because section 105(a) standards must be
met, a more stringent standard is set for reimposition of the stay. See id. at 70001. This will prevent any harm to the creditor, because the debtor would have
been entitled to a continuance of the stay but for a timely order. See id. at 701.
For a discussion of the standard for relief under section 362(d) as compared
with that required under section 105(a), see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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ciliation of the apparent conflict between sections 105(a) and 362(e). 50
In the instant case, this analysis was of no avail to Realty because the
court found that Realty did not properly pursue it below. 5 1
The court in Wedgewood followed the clear congressional mandate
regarding time constraints on relief from stay motions. 5 2 Court inaction, due to overcrowding and outdated procedure, was the reason behind the enactment of the time limits. 5 3 Congress had changed and
streamlined the procedure for the express purpose of protecting secured creditors. 54 It recognized the need for quick repossession where
the debtor was not effectively using the property and could not provide
adequate protection.5 5 The Third Circuit, therefore, advanced express
congressional policy in its opinion in Wedgewood.
Although the opinion does not change or expand the substantive
requirements of section 362(e)'s thirty day time constraint, 56 the court
50. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701. The court stated, "To deny consideration
of relief under section 105(a) where the automatic stay has terminated because
the court, through no fault of the debtor, has failed to issue a timely order effectively strips a debtor of all protection." Id.
51. Id. at 702. In Wedgewood. Realty did not apply to the bankruptcy court
for section 105(a) relief, but only raised the issue on appeal. The record below
did not support the granting of such relief. Id.
52. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 175, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6136.

Creditors may obtain relief from the stay if their interests would be
harmed by the continuance of the stay. The bill enunciates the standards for relief, and further provides that unless the court acts quickly,
the relief is automatic on request by a creditor. Too often today, court
delay in handling requests for relief amounts to a complete denial of
relief.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The court described the time constraints contained in
section 362(e) as an "essential underpinning to the automatic stay provisions of
the Code." Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 698.
53. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 175, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6136. Congress noted that court delay had effectively denied relief
to secured creditors. Id. One circuit court has considered court overcrowding
an insufficient basis for the reimposition of a lapsed stay through section 105(a).
See In re Looney, 823 F.2d 788, 792-93 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977
(1987). In Looney, the court had acknowledged it had the power under section
105(a) but found that an overcrowded docket was not a proper basis for using
that power. Id.
54. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 344, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS at 6300. Section 362(e) was intended to provide protection for secured
creditors not available previously. Id.
55. SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 52-53, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5838-39. The Senate Report, in discussing section 362(e) found
that the bankruptcy laws provided too safe a haven for "single asset apartment
type cases." Id. at 53, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5839. Nonoperating real estate entities would receive strict scrutiny in section 362 cases.
Id. The Senate also added that section 362(d) actions should be given calendar
priority so as not to prejudice the rights of secured creditors. Id.
56. Three other circuits in looking at section 362(e) have formulated almost
identical schedules to the one set forth in Wedgewood. In the Eleventh Circuit the
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does provide clear guidance on what will be considered a waiver of these
time constraints. 57 Waiver of the time constraints was a major argument
of the debtor in the instant case. 58 Realty had argued that the posthearing letter by Wedgewood was an implied waiver, and both the bankruptcy court and district court on appeal had agreed. 59
The Third Circuit's strict construction of what will be considered an
implied waiver requires clear creditor action inconsistent with the time
constraints of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. 60 The effect of Wedgewood can be seen in a recent decision of a bankruptcy court in the Third
Circuit. 6 1 In In re City Wide Press, Inc., the bankruptcy court went through

a detailed procedural history in its opinion for the express purpose of
showing waiver by the party seeking relief from the stay. 62 Because of
the tough stance taken by the Wedgewood court, the bankruptcy courts in
the Third Circuit may be as cautious as the City Wide court in handling
section 362 cases.
The court, in Wedgewood, did recognize that court inaction may be
the cause of harm to an innocent debtor.63 Accordingly, the court affirmed the power of the bankruptcy court to issue an injunction to reimpose the stay where it has lapsed because of the time limits. 64 This
alternative is not available on a regular basis, and the debtor must show
that equitable relief is required. 6 5 The court is left with the necessary
flexibility to be equitable in specific cases, but it may not circumvent
court found that section 362(e) and Federal Bankruptcy Rule 4001 set up three
thirty-day periods which governed relief from stay procedure. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (11 th Cir. 1982). This schedule
was followed by both the Fifth and Fourth Circuits. See In re Looney, 823 F.2d
788, 792-93 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing In re Martin Exploration Co., 731 F.2d 1210,
1213 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Borg-Warner, 685 F.2d at 1308)). All three use a
schedule similar to the one found in Wedgewood. See Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 697.
57. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 698-99.
58. Id.
59. Id. Both courts found the post-hearing submissions to have pushed

back the effective date of the final hearing to October 26. Id. They had considered the submission to be a waiver of the 30 day rule. Id. The Third Circuit,
however, required a clearer indication of waiver. Id. at 698.
60. Id. at 698-99. The court found that the bankruptcy court could have
ordered a response to the letter of Wedgewood within the 30 day period so no
implied waiver was shown. Id. at 699.
61. In re City Wide Press, Inc., 102 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
62. Id. at 432-34. In City Wide, the procedural history took more than two
pages to complete, and the judge detailed almost every action by the moving
creditor. Id.
63. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701. The bankruptcy court in Wedgewood was the
sole cause of the delay and the resulting termination of the stay. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The debtor must meet the section 105(a) standards for an injunction which require a greater showing than a creditor would need for relief from
the stay. Id.
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congressional policy by widespread use of section 105(a). 6 6 The court
67
termed this a "safety net" for the debtor.
An important implication for bankruptcy practitioners in the Third
Circuit will be how to handle section 105(a) motions to reimpose the
stay. 6 8 The motion for reimposition of the stay must come from the
debtor and not from the court sua sponte.69 The debtor must meet all of
the procedural and substantive requirements of an injunction in the federal system. 70 These modifications of section 105(a) will protect both
71
the debtor and creditor and advance the congressional scheme.
The reasoning of courts which refuse to allow section 105(a) to be
invoked, where the inadvertence of counsel or the court has caused sec72
tion 362(e) to be triggered, has been criticized as harsh and wooden.
Wedgewood demonstrates that it is manifestly unfair for bankruptcy courts
not to consider the use of section 105(a) where it will facilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor.

73

This safety net provided by section 105(a) tempers any harsh results
which a strict application of section 362(e) would otherwise bring
about.7 4 Absent the section 105(a) safety net, a minor procedural foulup could cause the debtor to lose a necessary asset where, if a timely
order had issued or a hearing been held, the stay would have continued. 75 Because the bankruptcy court will only use section 105(a) to
66. Id. The court found that the "interplay between section 362 and section 105 advances rather than undermines Congressional objectives .... " Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 700-01.

69. Id. at 701. "The relief under section 105(a), however, is neither automatic nor may it be imposed sua sponte by the court." Id. The bankruptcy court
may only issue injunctions in accordance with the bankruptcy rules which allow
injunctions only "on application of a debtor, trustee or debtor-in-possession."
FED. BANKR. R. 7065; see In re Looney, 823 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1987).
70. These requirements are more fully set forth at supra note 49. The court

found that these requirements are necessary to prevent any harm to the creditor.
Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701.

71. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701. The court found that the "interplay between section 362 and section 105 advances rather than undermines congressional objectives by protecting the interests of both the creditor and debtor." Id.
The creditor is protected by limiting the occasions where section 105(a) is applicable, and the debtor is protected by allowing the use of section 105(a) to reimpose the stay in proper circumstances. Id.
72. In re Clark, 69 Bankr. 885, 893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
73. For an example of such unfair treatment, see In re Wood, 33 Bankr.
320, 321 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983) (debtor denied section 105(a) relief allegedly
would have been able to formulate plan and provide adequate protection).
74. A bankruptcy court in the Third Circuit which approved of the use of
section 105(a) to reinstate a lapsed stay, found the reasoning of the opposing
line of cases to be "admittedly harsh, and ... wooden." In re Clark, 69 Bankr.
885, 893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
75. Two cases where a procedural foulup caused a lapse in the stay are examples of the extreme hardship which can be caused where there is no section
105(a) safety net.
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reimpose the stay where the stay would have been continued anyway,
there is no harm to the creditor. 76 By requiring a strict application of
section 362(e), while allowing an expanded section 105(a) safety net, the
court has fashioned a workable and fair approach to the procedural aspects of relief from stay motions.
Albert A. Ciardi, III
In In re Marine Power Equipment Company the court failed to hold a timely

hearing, and the secured creditor, the United States, was able to foreclose on 28
tugs and barges valued at 53.6 million dollars. 71 Bankr. 925, 927 (W.D. Wash.
1987). The district court would not even consider a modification of the requirements of section 362(e) even for "an apparent good reason." Id. at 929.
Marine Power relied on the decision in In re Wood for its conclusion that section 105(a) cannot be used to ameliorate section 362(e). Id. at 929-31. In In re
Wood, although the counsel for the debtor inadvertently failed to make a hearing

request and the court considered the result harsh, the court refused to consider
using section 105(a), because it found that to do so was improper judicial legislating. 33 Bankr. 320, 322 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983). This resulted even though
the debtors were allegedly able to provide adequate protection and formulate a
workable plan. Id. at 321.
76. Wedgewood, 878 F.2d at 701.
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